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Resumen
La automatización de viviendas es un campo de la tecnoloǵıa que siempre se encuen-
tra en crecimiento, desarrollando sistemas que reducen los costos de los dispositivos.
Por esto, se ha logrado que la domótica esté al alcance de todos. Desde la aparición
de productos que permiten crear tu propio sistema domótico, y la reciente popular-
idad que ha tenido el Internet de las cosas (IoT), la industria de la automatización
de viviendas ha cambiado mucho. Tener la habilidad de controlar dispositivos a
través de Internet crea numerosas vulnerabilidades al sistema, permitiend a un at-
acante controlar y ver todo lo que ocurre. En este trabajo se estudia un sistema
domótico que usa 1-wire como protocolo de comunicación. Originalmente, el sistema
carece de seguridad. Nuestro objetivo es implementar seguridad de la información a
través de la encriptación de los comandos del sistema, para aśı poder proveer Con-
fidencialidad, Integridad y Disponibilidad (CIA). Los resultados muestran no sólo la
implementación exitosa del módulo criptográfico dentro del sistema domótico para
proveer seguridad, sino que también se demuestra que añadir este proceso no afectaŕıa
el modo en que el usuario maneja sus dispositivos.
Palabras clave: Domótica, Seguridad, 1-wire.
Abstract
Home automation is a technology that is permanently growing thanks to te develop-
ment of devices that reduces the costs of these kind of systems. This makes domotics
an affordable option to everyone.
Thanks to the appearance of this low cost devices, and the recent popularity
around the Internet of Things (IoT) technology, the domotics industry has changed
to a new level. Having ability to control devices through the Internet creates nu-
merous vulnerabilities to an unprotected system, allowing an attacker to control or
see everything. In this work, we present a domotic system which uses the 1-wire
communication protocol. Originally, the system lacks of any kind of security. Our
objective is to implement information security through the encryption of the system’s
commands, so we can assure the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availabil-
ity). The results show not only the successful implementation of the cryptographic
modulo into the system to provide security, but we also prove that adding this extra
process would not affect the way the final users handle and use their devices.
Keywords: Domotics, Security, 1-wire.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
One of the most important considerations that a home automation system must
take into account, is how to establish communication between the different devices
that are connected and controlled by the smart home. Depending on how it is
established, it is possible to also connect the system to the Internet, allowing the
user the possibility of controlling everything remotely. This new ability can create
more disadvantages than advantages itself if there is no security implemented. An
attacker could compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the system without
the owner realizing that something is happening until it’s too late [58, 35, 55, 51, 34].
No matter what is the real intention of the intruder, in any case it becomes a direct
attack to the privacy of the inhabitants of the home.
This is enough to know that we need to ensure that the communication of the
system is being established in a secure way. This means, to avoid the leaking of
information and protect the data of any interference or corruption [71, 27]. We are
studying a domotic system that uses 1-wire as its communication protocol, the prob-
lem is, that 1-wire is completely vulnerable to an intruder’s attack. On this system,
the plaintext of the commands are sent through the whole system, allowing any user
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Figure 1.1: Insecure scenario of a domotic system connected to the Internet.
(authorized or not) to read, intercept (eavesdropping [70]) and change information.
Plus, it is difficult to identify if something has been done without authorization.
Given that there are many installations already in place using the 1-wire protocol,
we are focusing on this protocol specifically.
1.1 Justification
According to Statista [74], in 2016 there were around 14.2 million smart homes in
the United States alone, and this number is expected to grow to 36.01 million for
2020. With this number permanently increasing, we can’t take security for granted.
Domotic systems are often vulnerable to confidentiality and integrity attacks. An
attacker could control a household remotely o simply look into the routine of the
people living there [35]. This situation can become easily in a physical attack to the
user given that the intruder could open the door remotely, or control the devices
in a way that causes some sort of physical damage to the inhabitants of the house
[55, 51, 34]. This is why we must prevent these attacks through the implementation
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of information security in these domotic systems.
1.2 Objectives
Having in mind the problem stated above, we have set the objectives for this thesis
work.
1.2.1 General Objective
To identify a cryptographic technique capable of defending itself against the more
common attacks (ciphertext-only attack, known plaintext attack, chosen plaintext
attack), that fulfills the security requirements (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability)
and adjusts to the 1-wire system’s restrictions applied to domotics.
1.2.2 Specific Objectives
• To identify the communication restrictions and the inherent characteristics of
the system.
• To select cryptographic techniques suitable for the system that can be imple-
mented through the 1-wire protocol.
• To compare the implementation of the selected cryptographic techniques on
the system to determine that the security requirements are fulfilled.
Chapter 2.
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we will talk about domotics in general, the different communication
protocols used for home automation systems and their vulnerabilities on the security
matter. Here we also make a revision of the restrictions that a system using 1-wire
could have. This way we are fulfilling the first specific objective by describing the
different limitations that we must take into account to be able to choose an strategy
to solve the information security issue.
2.1 Domotics or Home Automation Systems
Domotics is defined in many ways, depending on the use and what is the user is
controlling. A broad definition of home automation is “the capacity to automate
and control multiple systems” [17, 45]. Others like Goodwin [31] take for instance,
the objective of the automation itself, defining this kind of automation as anything
the home does to make people’s lives more productive or comfortable. There is also
the concept that domotics is a set of systems that allow to control and automate a
household through a master that manages the actions of said systems [38]. We could
spend a lot of time trying to get a universal definition of what home automation is
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and what represents in people’s lives. But something we can agree on, is that the
main goal of these systems is to automate devices that make rutinary tasks a little
it easier.
2.2 History of Home Automation
Home automation systems have been around for a long time, more than you would
have thought. The concept of an automated home has been developing since the
creation of the first home appliances.
1901-1920: Home Appliances
The invention of home appliances was the first step to lead us to the automated home.
These machines allowed housewives around the world to save time, money and energy
in every day tasks. The invention of the first engine-powered vacuum cleaner (1901)
started a time when electricity could help create electricity-powered machines [78].
During these two decades, besides vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, washing machines,
toasters, irons, among other things were invented [32].
1966: ECHO IV
The ECHO IV was invented by James Sutherland from Westinghouse, it also was
known as the first automation machine, although it wasn’t a commercial success at
the time. This device could performed tasks simple to us nowadays, such as control
the temperature of the household, turn on and off the appliances available, make
shopping lists, and even manage the family accounting [32, 64, 72].
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Figure 2.1: ECHO IV machine. Known as the first home automation machine. Taken
from [64].
1975: X10
X10 was the first general purpose network technology for use in home automation [9],
and it’s still a common communication protocol to use. It is an affordable and simple
communication standard that uses the power line to remotely control the devices in
the system [26, 16]. It is known to be very easy to use, install, and it does not need
a central unit to control the devices [36].
1991: Gerontechnology
Home automation started to get into this combination between technology inclusion
and the elder in need of assistance in the 90’s. Different systems to assist the elder
appeared to give a better care and be warned if something wasn’t right with the
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health of the person [13, 14, 29]. At this time, home automation began to be not
just a luxury or something to be a little more comfortable or organized with, the
development of new systems could help the elder and the handicapped to live an
easier and more independent life.
Early 2000s: Smart homes
Although the concept of home automation and the longing of your own home to help
you with basic tasks has been around for a long time, it’s in the early 2000s when
the popularity of the smart homes increased more than any other time. With the
development of different technologies, it also started to become more affordable for
all people [32].
2010s: Smart Homes and IoT
Nowadays, home automation is not only about automatize processes, it is about
connectivity too. The importance of controlling remotely the systems is key for
certain processes and to monitor the state of your household. With the new paradigm
of the Internet of Things (IoT), it is possible to connect literally any device to the
Internet. These systems are able to make decisions based on the data collected
by the sensors installed. In today’s home automation technology, we have infinite
possibilities to integrate different technologies that can allow us to take the most of
it.
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2.3 Security Vulnerabilities on Communication Pro-
tocols
There are many ways to communicate your devices and convert your home in a
smart one. The communication protocol can be wired or wireless, it all depends on
the user’s preference or the manufacturer’s. In this section we will talk about the
vulnerabilities and some countermeasures that some of the most used communication
protocols in domotics have. Then, we will concentrate on the vulnerabilities of the
1-wire protocol, given that this protocol is used by the domotic system that we are
studying.
2.3.1 X10
As said before, the X10 was the first network technology used for home automation,
using the power line to control different devices. In an X10-based home network
we can find a limited number of change state commands, these are: On, off, dim,
bright, all lights on, all lights off, and all units off, extended code, hail request, hail
acknowledge, pre-set dim, status on, status off, status request. The commands are all
sent by a 4-bit code. Also, there is a limit of 256 devices in an X10 system [16, 39].
In this protocol, is pretty easy to perform a brute force attack on the system,
given that each network has a unique 4-bit ID number. This means that there is
only 16 possible ID numbers [63]. Note that there is no encryption at all, and the
possibilities of interference are high.
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Another flaw is that that you can turn off every device with a single command.
For example, if someone connects an X10 device outside your house (if you have an
electric socket outside of course), that person can turn off all of your devices. A thief
can use this to turn off your alarm and get into your house [63]. Moreover, Kennedy
and Simon [39], developed a pair of tools named X10 Sniffer, and X10 Blackout. With
the first one, the attacker can know what the devices are doing inside the household.
With the second tool, the attacker can create interference with the operation of the
devices.
A simple solution seems to be the use of an isolation transformer to separate lines
for x10 devices and devices that are not X10 [63].
2.3.2 Z-Wave
Z-wave (Sigma Designs, California) is a wireless proprietary protocol and RF-based
[36] that allows a two-way communication. A Z-Wave network can have up to 232
devices, but the possibility of bridging two networks exists, although is not so common
to see [16]. The network consists on a controller and controlled nodes (or slaves),
this protocol allows the inclusion of new devices.
A single network can have different Z-Wave chips, we can find a variety of 200, 300
and 400 series. A very important note, chips from 200 and 300 series can’t encrypt
messages, but the 400 series can do it without problem. For obvious reasons, if you
have a network with 400 series, but only one 200 series, the attacker can “sniff” the
messages traffic that goes through the WPAN [63].
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Thieves can use software like Wireshark (The Wireshark team, California) to
observe the behavior of the person living in the house. No need to mention the
danger of having some stranger knowing your entire schedule.
Fouladi [28] found an implementation vulnerability in the key exchange protocol
that can be used to open the Z-Wave door lock. This attack was done by observing
the network traffic for a short time and getting the target device’s ID .
One way to countermeasure an attack would be to use only 400 series chips
and forward, to make sure that the network can encrypt the messages. Also, the
recommendation is to change the Advance Encryption Service (AES) keys in a regular
basis [63].
2.3.3 ZigBee
ZigBee is a standard for low-power, low-rate wireless communication used in automa-
tion applications [63, 23]. This protocol is based on the IEEE 802.15.4-2003 standard
[76].
ZigBee, unlike the other protocols described before, provides facilities for secure
communications, like stablish and transport cryptographic keys [23]. The security
concepts used by ZigBee are divided in four concepts [76]:
• Security Level: where we can find two security levels (High Security and Stan-
dard Security).
• Trust Center: Responsible for the security management. There are three types
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of keys (the network key, the master key, and the link key)
• Authentication and Data Encryption: The encryption used is a 128-bit Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) with CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC).
• Integrity and Freshness of Data: ZigBee uses several security keys and methods
to make sure there is integrity.
Vidgren [76] describes two possible attacks to this protocol. One of them de-
scribes an “End-Device Sabotage Attack”, where the attacker impersonates the Zig-
Bee Router (ZR) or the ZigBee Coordinator (ZC) of the ZigBee-enabled system. And
the other is a “Network Key Sniffing Attack”, where the messages traffic is observed.
Key management is key in this protocol, but if the user doesn’t have strong pass-
words, the protection lowers a lot. In [76], they give some practical countermeasures.
For the “End-Device Sabotage Attack”, we can use a remote alerting system for
warning about power failures, but this requires an active role of a network admin-
istrator. And for the “Network Key Sniffing Attack”, the user can preinstall the
network key when using the Standard Security level, but this is not practical when
there is a large network.
2.3.4 1-wire
The 1-wire protocol (Maxim Integrated, California) was designed by Dallas Semicon-
ductor, now known as Maxim Integrated. This protocol is similar to the I2C bus,
with the difference that instead of using two cables for transmitting the signal and
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other one for power supply [60], 1-wire uses one cable for control, signal transmission
and power, and other one as reference [6, 44]. This protocol follows a strict Master-
Slave scheme, where one or more slave devices can be connected at the same time.
Although it is possible, according to Jayapriya’s work, where an implementation of
1-wire using multiple masters is shown [37], only a master is enough to fulfill the
requirements of most applications where is used [3]. A basic scheme of the protocol





Slave 1 Slave 2 Slave 3
Figure 2.2: Basic scheme of 1-wire
In this protocol, there is no inherent security implemented, there is no encryption
or key management at all, it is a simple channel to transmit information. Anyone
could connect to the 1-wire bus in any part of the installation and start controlling
the system by sending the right commands through the communication line. Also,
if the attacker has no knowledge of how the commands are formed, it is possible to
observe the behavior of the system. It would be just a matter of time before the
intruder guess which commands are used to turn on and off the different devices, or
how to control the volume of the music, among other things connected to the bus.
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2.4 Lightweight Ciphers
A possibility to implement security in a communication protocol like 1-wire,could
be the creation of a cryptographic module before the master and each slave, so we
can apply some security to it. This is also to avoid greater costs to the system by
making more radical changes. An important factor needs to be addressed in the
context of domotics, we need the cryptographic module to fulfill the security and
privacy requirements of the users, and at the same time, we need to do it in a way
it doesn’t interfere with the performance of the system. One of these factors is the
response time, we need the information to be encrypted, sent to destination, and
decrypted without the user noticing there is something else going on. We need the
user’s experience to remain unchanged, but with security of their information added
to it.
There are a lot of ciphers that could accomplish this requirement. The category
of Lightweight Cryptography was born to help us with these kind of requirements.
With the new arising of the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm, a new information
security problem came along: Ensure information to highly constrained devices in
aspects such as memory space, energy, and others. We can find several ciphers that
are considered inside this new category such as SIMON & SPECK, Hummingbird,
KLEIN, KATAN, TEA, PRESENT, Curupira, DESL, among others [59, 1]. Most
of these are block ciphers, which are normally sensitive to linear and differential
cryptanalysis. The success of these ciphers lies on the complexity of the algorithm
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and the number of rounds used [73]. Depending on the application, we must choose
the cipher that best suits our needs.
2.4.1 AES Encryption Algorithm
Rijndael was the winner algorithm of the contest organized by the NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology) for the new Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) for the United States on the year 2000 [21]. This cipher is a widely used
encryption algorithm in many devices, including those categorized into the Internet
of Things.
The AES is a block cipher that provides security through a series of operations
executed in a determined amount of rounds. Unlike the original version that won
the contest, AES only allows the encryption of 128 bits blocks. The allowed sizes for
the keys are 128, 192 and 256 bits. Depending on the size of the key, the amount of
rounds are 10, 12 and 14 respectively [21, 46, 10].





For the last round, the same operations are used except for the MixColumn. The
decryption process is made by inversing the operations mentioned before [21, 46].
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Figure 2.3: Encryption process of the AES algorithm. Based on [46]
In Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4, we can see the encryption and decryption process
of the AES algorithm.
The work of Moradi et. al [52], shows us two successful fault attacks that manage
to get the 128-bit key of the AES algorithm. The first one only needs 6 faulty
ciphertexts, and the other one around 1500. the fault based cryptanalysis made by
Blömer et. al [10] showed that using 256 faulty encryptions was possible to get the
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Figure 2.4: Decryption process of the AES algorithm. Based on [46]
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key. Kim et. al [40] also tried a differential fault analysis attack, in this work the
authors succeeded in getting the key with 4 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts
in less than 2.3 seconds. Although this algorithm is very fast and useful for many
applications, we can see that now it is possible to break the key and get the plaintext.
2.4.2 Hummingbird Lightweight Cipher
Hummingbird is an ultra-lightweight cryptography algorithm created for using on
low-cost RFID tags. This particular cipher is a combination of block cipher and
stream cipher. The encryption algorithm consists in four 16-bit block ciphers Ek1,
Ek2, Ek3 and Ek4, four 16-bit internal state registers RS1, RS2, RS3 and RS4, and
a 16-stage LFSR. It uses a 256-bit key that is divided in four 64-bit subkeys called
k1, k2, k3 and k4. Each of these keys are used on the previously mentioned 16-bit
block ciphers [24, 25]. To better resume how the encryption and decryption works,
see Figure 2.5 and 2.6.
The authors of this cipher claim that Hummingbird is resistant to attacks such
as birthday attacks, differential and linear cryptanalysis, structure attacks, algebraic
attacks, and cube attacks [25]. Saarinen [66] on the other hand says that there is
an exploitable flaw in the initialization process, given that it has a high-bit XOR
differential that holds with probability 1. The author also makes an observation that
if a collision occurs inside the cipher, there is a one-round iterated differential that
works. The attack is successful by attacking K4, then K3 and finally K2. We can
see that this cipher can be broken and the information would be revealed. This is an
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Figure 2.5: Encryption process of the Hummingbird algorithm. Based on [25]
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Figure 2.6: Decryption process of the Hummingbird algorithm. Based on [25]
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important concern depending on the application. In this case, the major application
are RFID cards that can be used in electronic payments, which makes the security a
very important issue.
2.4.3 PRESENT
This lighweight cipher was designed specially for very constrained devices like RFID
tags. It is an SPN type block cipher and consists on 31 rounds with block sizes of 64
bits. Two key sizes are supported: 80 and 128 bits. Also, this cipher is suitable to




In Figure 2.7, a description of a PRESENT round is depicted.
Collard et. al [19] claim that the PRESENT cipher was designed with very low
security margins. They used a statistical saturation attack and managed to break 15
round of the PRESENT cipher, but they offer the possibility to break more rounds.
Another attack was made by Ozen et. al [57], in their work they use a related-key
rectangle attack, where two short differential characteristics are used. The authors of
this attack claim that it is possible to get the right subkey or at least discard almost
all the wrong ones.
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Figure 2.7: One round of PRESENT. Based on [11].
2.4.4 KLEIN Family of Ciphers
KLEIN is a family of lightweight block ciphers that combines a 4-bit Sbox with Rijn-
dael’s byte-oriented MixColumn [5]. KLEIN’s structure is a Substitution-Permutation
Network (SPN), also used by other block ciphers like AES and PRESENT. The al-
gorithm is also built from an involutive 4-bit S-box. The number of round depend
on the KLEIN algorithm that is being used. The allowed number of rounds are 12,
16 and 20, for KLEIN-64, 80 and 96 respectively [30].
A KLEIN encryption round follows these steps:
1. AddRoundKey
2. SubNibbles, this operation applies the 4-bit S-box.
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3. RotateNibbles
4. MixNibbles, applies two MixColumns in parallel.
The authors of the algorithm claim that this algorithm is efficient in both hard-
ware and software implementations, although it was designed mainly for software.
Aumasson et. al [5], applied various attacks to the KLEIN cipher. According to the
authors, the attack is possible by a high probability differential. They suggest that
the use of a 4-bit Sbox is not a good security feature.
2.4.5 KATAN and KTANTAN Families of Ciphers
KATAN and KTANTAN are two flavors of the same family. Each of them contain
three block ciphers. KATAN uses 32, 48 and 64-bit block sizes, and KTANTAN uses
the same sizes as well, but it is more compact in hardware because the key is burnt
into the device [22].
The KATAN family uses 254 rounds to generate the ciphertext. Two registers L1
and L2 are used to load the plaintext. In each round, L1 and L2 are shifted to the
left. New computed bits are stored in the least significant bits after every shift. After
the 254 rounds, you obtain the ciphertext. The only difference between KATAN and
KTANTAN is that the second needs a choice of subkey bits to provide some kind of
flexibility, given that the key is fixed. The problem is to find a good subkey sequence
[22].
In terms of security, Bogdanov et. al [12] describe a Man in the Middle Attack
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(MITM) that breaks the KTANTAN family of ciphers. The work of Knellwolf et.
al [41] shows a conditional differential cryptanalysis where they recovered the key of
the KATAN family of ciphers up to 120 of 254 rounds.
2.4.6 TEA (Tiny Encryption Algorithm)
The Tiny Encryption Algorithm is known to be a very fast block cipher and does not
use S-boxes or predefined tables. The rounds follow a Feistel structure and accepts
64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys [77]. The code of is simple and compact, as shown in
the following code:
void code ( long∗ v , long∗ w, long∗ k )
{ unsigned long y=v [ 0 ] , z=v [ 1 ] , sum=0,
de l t a=0x9e3779b9 , n=32;
while (n−−>0)
{
sum += de l t a ;
y+=(z<<4)+k [ 0 ] ˆ z+sumˆ( z>>5)+k [ 1 ] ;
z+=(y<<4)+k [ 2 ] ˆ y+sumˆ(y>>5)+k [ 3 ] ;
}
w[0]= y ; w[1 ]= z ;
}
Hernández et. al [33] presented a method of constructing distinguishers for cryp-
tographic mapping, proving that the TEA cipher is not secure when using less than
five rounds. If they change all operations in the TEA algorithm for XOR, the attack
is effective with 128 rounds.
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2.4.7 Curupira Block Cipher
Curupira is a block cipher that operates with 96-bits blocks and allows keys of 96,
144 and 192 bits. The number of rounds can vary depending on the key size. For
96-bit keys, the rounds go from 10 to 11. For 144-bit keys, from 14 to 17 rounds.
And for 192-bit keys, from 18 to 23 rounds [7].
A round of Curupira can be described by Equation 2.1. Assuming that the subkey
numbering starts from k0 [7].
ηk(x) = θ ◦ π ◦ γ σk(x) = θ(π(γ(σk(x)))), x ∈ Mn (2.1)
Nakahara [54] performed several attacks against the Curupira cipher that were
not analyzed by the cipher’s authors. This attacks included Impossible-Differential
Attack, Boomerang analysis, Plaintext Leakage, Related-key attack and Related-
cipher attack. The author explains that is able to attack the Curupira algorithms up
to certain rounds, and that the vulnerability depends on the applications where it’s
used.
2.4.8 DESL
The DESL cipher is a lightweight version of the DES algorithm made to be applied
to constrained devices. In this new form of the DES algorithm, the eight S-boxes
originally used are replaced for a single one. This algorithm uses a 64-bit block size
and a 56-bit key and the ciphertext/plaintext is generated in sixteen rounds [43, 61].
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Although this cipher provides better security than the DES cipher, it is still not
comparable to the AES algorithm. Also, DESL has a worse performance than the
mentioned AES algorithm [62].
2.4.9 Simon and Speck Algorithms
On June 2013, the National Security Agency (NSA) published two families of block
ciphers called Simon and Speck [8]. They were created to have a great performance in
both hardware and software. Although this is true, the authors make the clarification
that Simon shows a better performance in hardware implementations, and Speck
in software implementations. The application of these ciphers was not specified,
claiming that they are very flexible in terms of their usage. This is due to the
range of block and key sizes that are allowed. Simon and Speck have an exceptional
performance in 8-bit microcontrollers with minimal flash and SRAM usage, according
to the authors.
Each algorithm inside both Simon and Speck are denoted as Simon2n/mn and
Speck2n/mn, where 2n represents the block size in bits and mn the size of the key
in bits [8]. Table 2.1 shows the different Simon and Speck versions according to their
block size.
Simon Algorithm.
Simon follows a Feistel network structure. As shown in Fig. 2.8, each round requires
three main operations:
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Table 2.1: Block and key sizes for Simon and Speck. Sizes are in bits.





128 128, 192, 256
• Bitwise XOR,
⊕
• Bitwise AND, &
• Left circular shift, Sj, by j bits.
One round of Simon is defined by Equation 2.2:
Rk(x, y) = (y ⊕ f(x)⊕ k, x) (2.2)
Where f(x) = (Sx&S8x)⊕ S2x), and k is the round key [8].
For decryption, we use the inverse of the previous operation, defined by Equation
2.3:
R−1k(x, y) = (y, x⊕ f(y)⊕ k) (2.3)
Simon includes no plaintext and ciphertext whitening steps, because it would
affect the size of the circuit. The first and last rounds do nothing cryptographically,
they just bring in the first and last round keys [8].
The Simon key schedules use a sequence of 1-bit round constants to eliminate
any circular shift symmetries due to the fact that all rounds in Simon are exactly the
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Figure 2.8: One round of Simon. Based on Beaulieu et. al [8]
same apart from the round key. There are five different sequences (Z0, ..., Z4) defined
to differentiate Simon version with the same block size.
Speck Algorithm.
For a round of SPECK, as shown in Fig. 2.9, we need the following operations:
• Bitwise XOR,
⊕
• Addition modulo 2n, + &
• Left and right circular shifts, Sj, S−j, by j bits.
One round of Speck is defined by Equation 2.4:
Rk(x, y) = ((S
−αx+ y)⊕ k, Sβy ⊕ (S−αx+ y)⊕ k) (2.4)
Where α and β represent the rotation amounts for each round. If n = 16, then
the values are α = 7 and β = 2. And the same values will be α = 8 and β = 3 for
the rest of the values of n.
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Figure 2.9: One round of Speck. Based on Beaulieu et. al [8]
The inverse function used for decryption is depicted in Equation 2.5:
R−1k (x, y) = ((S
α((x⊕ k)− S−β(x⊕ y)), S−β(x⊕ y)) (2.5)
The key schedule of the Speck generates round keys ki by using the round function.
The Key K used is defined by a sequence of values ki and li as K = (lm−2, ..., l0, k0).
The sequence li+m−1 is defined as li+m−1 = (ki+S
−αli)⊕i. The sequence ki is defined
as ki+1 = S
βki ⊕ li+m−1.
The cryptanalysis of the Simon algorithm made by Alkhzaimi and Lauridsen [2],
has shown that in the smaller version of Simon there is a strong differential effect.
Tupsamudre et. al [75] have attacked the Simon and Speck families through a fault
attack and succeeded
Chapter 3.
State of the Art
Before diving in into how to solve this security issue, we need to make a review of
what has already been done around this topic in order to give a working solution.
In this work, we are studying a domotic system using 1-wire, but we will also make
a revision on how this matter is being handled for other communication protocols
(I2C, CAN Bus, SDI-12, SCADA, among others).
3.1 Communication Protocols
Some communication protocols exist that behave in a similar way as 1-wire, allowing
a wired channel to transmit data between devices. Some examples of these protocols
are I2C, the CAN Bus, SDI-12, SCADA, among others.
For the I2C bus, many algorithms have been used to fulfill the security require-
ment for each application. Zhu et. al [79], used serial chip with a 64K I2C to transmit
data from a radar to another with an acceptable level of confidentiality by using AES.
The Atmel SAMA5D3 series of embedded MPU [67], includes hardware engines for
encryption with AES, TDES and hash functions to prevent cloning and secure exter-
nal data transfers. Lázaro et. al [42], presented a way to secure the I2C protocol for
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chip-to-chip communications. To secure it, they used the AES-GCM cryptographic
and authentication algorithm. The authors claim that the securing this protocol in
this way will allow to add security into applications where the computation resources
are constrained.
In the context of domotics that use I2C as communication channel, Marginean
et. al [47] used Hash based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) to encrypt the
information coming from the I2C sensors connected to their system. The authors
say that they still need to work with some security experts to be able to know what
to do with the data files generated by the system. Mazlan et. al [48], show a smart
home network system that supports I2C and SPI communication protocols. They
used Programming Lock for Flash Program and EEPROM for data security, but said
that this security of the data is not enough when there is a larger amount of nodes.
Chandia et. al [18], made some recommendations for security in SCADA net-
works, where they suggest to use symmetric keys (AES and SHA1) to guarantee
confidentiality and integrity.
Shah et. al [69], created an ”Energy conscious home”, where the sensors are
connected through various communication protocols like Serial UART, I2C, and 1-
Wire. The problem is that in this work, the information security is not even a
design concern when putting this system together. That is also the case for the
work presented by Moraes et. al [53], where they made a hardware implementation
for a home automation system using the CAN protocol. The authors even made an
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application to control the home remotely, but without considering the implementation
of any information security measures.
We can say that for the various wired communication protocols, there is still work
to do in terms of securing the information that travels through each line in a system.
More importantly, there are still several domotic developments where confidentiality
and integrity are not even part of the design. Most of the systems use AES encryption,
although it is not entirely safe, as explained in Section 2.4
3.2 1-Wire
The only solution that we found made to address the problem when using 1-wire,
it’s a device called iButton (Maxim Integrated, California), also developed by Maxim
Integrated, used as an authentication token.
The creation of this device was intended to replace many other methods of ac-
cess control such as smartcards, magnetic stripe cards, barcodes, and radio-frequency
proximity cards (RFID). They wanted to provide portability and security to cash-
less transactions, PKI, authentication, identification, Internet commerce and other
processes [68]. For this device, the authors implemented a cryptographic engine that
uses SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) to hide the valuable information that stores.
According to the creators of the iButton, this device accomplishes to secure the
information contained in it. But as we have found in the literature, there are a
couple of ways to break the iButton’s security. For instance Kingpin [4], noticed that
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a false response created by introducing a false password, it’s not entirely random.
This response is based on the input and a constant block of data that is being stored
inside the iButton. What the author did to find the correct password, was to pre-
compute the 48-byte return value that is expected from a wrong answer. Then, the
return values are checked to see if they are a match, if the real returned value does not
match the pre-computed one, that means the input that was tested it’s the correct
password.
Another attack that proves the iButton is not completely secure, is a non-invasive
side-channel analysis performed by Oswald [56]. The analysis is made to extract the
64 bit secret key that is stored in the device. Also by using a differential fault attack
and implementation attack, Brandt et. al [15] managed to get the secret key. This
attack is also a very fast one, considering it took them less than ten minutes to prep
and execute it.
The iButton still has a long way to be considered as a replacement of smartcards
and an option to make electronic payments. Maxim Integrated has other types of
solutions to secure the 1-wire protocol, but they all use SHA-1, so we can conclude
that they haven’t solved this security issue. Also we have to notice that no attempt
to secure the 1-wire channel has been done in the context of domotics.
Chapter 4.
Design and Implementation
The approach that we took to provide security for this system required a previous
definition of the scenario that we are working on. Then, we proceeded to select a
cryptographic algorithm that suits the system, based on the information of various
lightweight ciphers described in Section 2.4. By deciding which one to use, we are
fulfilling the second specific objective of this work. After that, we made the proper
implementation of the selected algorithm to the system through a cryptographic
module and that way fulfill the third specific objective.
4.1 Scenario
We chose a domotic system that uses 1-wire as communication protocol as case study
for this work. Right now there is no kind of information security implemented. As in
some examples in Section 3, security was not considered when designing the system.
In its original state, any intruder could connect a master device to the 1-wire bus
and start reading and sending commands to the devices as he/she pleases.
Figure 4.1, shows that the original scenario is a Home Area Network (HAN). And
the desired scenario is a Wide Area Network (WAN), given that nowadays, the users





Figure 4.1: General scenario of the system.
have the need to control their system remotely through the Internet. Until we can
secure the communication between the devices of the system, we cannot go from
HAN to WAN.
4.2 Selection of Cryptographic Algorithm
Looking into the restrictions of the system, mentioned in Section 2.3.4, we concluded
that a good strategy to add security is to create a cryptographic module that would
go between each module and the 1-wire line. This method also guarantees that the
cost of this security upgrade won’t be too high to both the domotics company and
the final user. By making an analysis of the possible cryptographic algorithms that
we could use (Summary of said analysis in Table 4.1), we came to the conclusion
of creating the cryptographic module using the Simon and Speck family of ciphers.
More specifically, we selected the Speck algorithm, given that it provides a better
performance in software implementations.
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Table 4.1: Summary of ciphers and their vulnerabilities
Algorithm Block Size(bits) Key Size(bits) #Rounds Vulnerability
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Compared to other Lightweight ciphers, Simon and Speck are said to have an
exceptional performance with minimal flash and SRAM usage. They are said to also
work better on AVR microcontrollers. Although this algorithm is susceptible to some
kind of attacks, it provides good security for our specific application and comes with
a great performance on the implementation of the cryptographic module.
4.3 Implementation
In this section we are going to explain what did we take into account when designing
this custom solution for our case study. The hardware used were a Raspberry Pi 3
model B (The Raspberry Pi Foundation, UK) as a master that can connect to the
Internet, and an Arduino Uno (Arduino, Italy) as the cryptographic module. The
software that we used included Python 2.7 (Python 2.7.0 Release, 2010) and the
Arduino IDE (Arduino, Italy) with the necessary libraries.
4.3.1 Hardware
As we said before, users nowadays want to control their domotic system remotely from
anywhere. To make this possible for the system, a Raspberry Pi 3. was included to
the system. The Raspberry Pi 3 is added as a master of the system, with the
capability of sending commands on its own. By adding this device, we could connect
to the system and start observing what was going on with the whole system. Proving
that way that it is possible to know what the different commands do without too
much effort.








Figure 4.2: Implementation on the domotic system.
To make the cryptographic module, we used an Arduino Uno as depicted in the
left-hand side of Figure 4.2. Also to be able to communicate the Arduino Uno with
the 1-wire protocol, we added an interface that allows this communication between
the serial port of the Arduino Uno (Tx and Rx pins, also known as UART) and the 1-
wire channel. The Arduino Uno, as cryptographic module, is in charge of encrypting
and decrypting the system’s commands and send the results where it needs to go.
The intention of using the Arduino Uno, is to be able to make a prototype of the
cryptographic module, and then move to an integrated chip that will do the same
work, but in a much smaller space. That way it will be possible to include it inside
the domotics module.
The characteristics of both Raspberry Pi and Arduino are shown in Table 4.3 and
Table respectively.
Table 4.2: Parameters of the Raspberry Pi 3 used in this work.
Parameter Value
CPU Model 64-bit quad-core ARMv8
Frequency 1.2 GHz
RAM 1GB
Operating System Raspbian Jessie
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Table 4.3: Parameters of the Arduino Uno used in this work.
Parameter Value
Microcontroller ATmega328P
Clock speed 16 MHz
SRAM 2 Kb
Flash memory 32 Kb
EEPROM 1 Kb
Figure 4.3: Block diagram showing the connection of the system.
In Figure 4.3, we show how the cryptographic module is connected to the domotic
system. The blocks showing Master/Slave in the figure, represent the original do-
motic modules without any modification. The blocks next to the domotic modules,
represent the cryptographic module in charge of encrypting or decrypting the incom-
ing message. When joining the original and the cryptographic modules, we make
sure that no one can be connected to the system between these two modules.
4.3.2 Software
For the two platforms that we are managing in this system (Raspberry Pi 3 and
Arduino Uno), we used a Python implementation of the algorithm and an Arduino
library respectively.
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Raspberry Pi
The Raspberry Pi that was implemented as a master, it does not need to have one
of the cryptographic modules mentioned above, given that it can encrypt and send,
and receive and decrypt on its own.
The implementation of the cryptographic algorithm was based on the Simon and
Speck python algorithms by Calvin McCoy [49]. The proprietary protocol of this
system we are studying, use different sizes of commands depending on the function.
Because of this, and that the cryptographic algorithms need a specific block size to
be defined in order to make the encryption and decryption, we divide the commands
in chunks of the desired block size. Then, we encrypt each part separately to join all
of them at the end of the process and send the result. We follow the same process
when decrypting the commands. This provides flexibility in terms of the size of the
commands sent by the system. We could have a very large command and encrypt and
decrypt it successfully. If a command is shorter than the defined block size, it would
not affect the process, given that as described in the Simon and Speck algorithms [8],
the remaining space would be filled with zeros and follow the encryption normally.
To test the functionality of the encryption, we measured the time it takes to the
Raspberry Pi to encrypt different lengths of commands using the Simon and Speck
algorithm, as seen in the published work based on these results [20]. In this case, we
divided the different commands in 32 bit chunks and proceeded with the encryption
process using the Simon32/64 and Speck32/64 algorithms. Then we compared the
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encryption/decryption times with two objectives: Check if the extra time taken to
send each command due to the encryption/decryption process would affect the user’s
experience, and prove which of both algorithms would suit better for our application.
Arduino UNO
To implement the same process on the Arduino Uno, we used the Crypto library
created by Github user rweather [65]. In the author’s documentation [65], it is said
that the use of the families with block sizes of 32, 48, 64, or 96 bits are too small
to be used in modern cryptosystems. That’s why the recommendation is to use the
128-bit block size with 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key sizes.
In Figure 4.4, we can see a flow diagram on how the Arduino software works. For
the encryption and decryption part (ENC/DEC), we used the function provided by
the Speck library. In Figure 4.5, we can see the flowchart describing that process.
In summary, the Arduino checks if there is information available on the serial
ports, if there is, takes the string and depending from which port comes from, the
string gets encrypted or decrypted. The last step is to send the encrypted/decrypted
string through the opposite serial port.
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Figure 4.4: Flowchart describing the process followed by the Arduino program.




The implementation of the Arduino Uno to the system is shown in Figure 5.1. We are
capable of communicate all the devices included in the implementation. The Arduino
Uno is capable of encrypting the commands that it receives and send them through
the 1-wire channel. In the same way, it is capable of receiving an incoming command
and decrypting it to send it to the domotics module. We also have tested how long
it takes for the whole process to happen, with the encrypting/decryption added to
the system. This way, besides guaranteeing security in the domotic system, we can
also see if this change would be perceptible to the users when using the system. The









Figure 5.1: Implementation on the domotic system.
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Table 5.1: Execution time data
Algorithm
Length Speck [ms] Simon [ms]
32 bits 0.5411137 0.5409502 0.8170261 0.8228535
48 bits 0.8173872 0.8144342 1.452703 1.453392
64 bits 0.813048 0.8173257 1.453032 1.457409
96 bits 1.099465 1.093212 2.10735 2.10833
128 bits 1.381253 1.376364 2.719511 2.721607
160 bits 1.639491 1.624422 3.356103 3.382519
192 bits 1.932254 1.915469 3.980706 3.986703
5.1 Execution Time
The execution time tells us how much time the algorithm takes to encrypt a command
with a determined length. Because this algorithm is symmetric, we assume that the
decryption time is almost the same as the encryption.
To prove which of the algorithms (Simon and Speck) is the best for our system,
we used a mixed factorial design to check if the length of the commands would affect
the response time of the system at the eyes of the final user. We used a Raspberry
Pi 3 model B to execute the encryption algorithms and measure the execution times.
The lengths of the commands tested were 32, 48, 64, 96, 128, 160 and 192 bits.
For the measures times to be statistically significant, we needed to run the encryption
program several times. We ran the program 10,000 times with one replicate to make
and then take the average of those measures. The R software (The R Foundation,
Austria) was used to obtain the graphics where the data is shown. In Table 5.1, we
can see the measured execution times for both Speck and Simon algorithm and the
different lengths of commands.
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of execution times between Simon and Speck algorithms.
The time is in seconds and the length is in bits.
We can see the difference in execution time on Figure 5.2. There is a clear
difference between the two algorithms when seen in the graph. The execution time
on the Speck algorithm does not increase by a lot when changing the commands
length. Simon on the other hand, has a greater difference when encrypting a 32 bits
command and a 192 bits one. Just by looking at the figure, the obvious decision
is to go with the Speck algorithm. We should also notice that the time is shown
in seconds, so in reality, the difference between the algorithms it’s not too much.
Simon only takes 0.002 s more than Speck when encrypting the largest command.
But still, we need to make sure that these times, in both algorithms would not affect
the response time of the system.
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5.2 Latency of the System
The importance of looking into the latency of the system relies on the fact that we
are checking if the cryptographic module would affect the user’s experience when
using the domotic system.
The baud rate of the 1-wire protocol is 9600 baud. We can calculate the time





The 1-wire protocol takes 104µs to send one bit of information. Having this
information, we can calculate that for a 32 bit string, the system would take 3.328ms
to send it. And for the largest command that we tested previously, it would take
19.968ms.
To understand better how these times of encryption and transmission affect the
performance of the system, we can see at Figure 5.3, where the process from sending
the command from one module to the reception in the final destination is depicted.
The command is first transmitted to the cryptographic module, the command gets
encrypted. Then is transmitted again until it gets to the next cryptographic module,
in which the command is decrypted. Finally, the command is transmitted once more
to get to the module that receives the order.
Looking at the data in Table 5.1, we can take for example, the average times
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Figure 5.3: Process to send a command.
when encrypting the largest command available in the system (192 bits). For Speck,
this time 1.9 milliseconds, and for Simon y 3.9 milliseconds. Taking into account the
process mentioned above, we have that the whole process to send a 192 bits command
takes 63.704ms and 67.704ms using Simon and Speck respectively. When making
this calculation, we can clearly see that the difference between both algorithms is
not much, given that the command still needs to go through the transmission in
the 1-wire line three times. According to Miller [50], anything that occurs in less
than 100 ms is perceived as instantaneous by an average human being. Therefore,
the whole process of sending, encrypting/decrypting would not be noticeable by the
users. The latency of the system would be up to 63.704ms or 67.704ms depending
on which algorithm is used. Shorter commands obviously would take less time than
that. Although the latency is bellow 100ms, we still need to find a way to reduce
these times even more.
5.3 Security
The main objective of this work is the implementation of security within the domotic
system. We have implemented the Speck algorithm in the cryptographic module
using an Arduino Uno. Given the cryptoanalysis described in Section 2.4.9, we
could not use Simon or Speck on their smaller versions. The smaller versions would
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of execution times between Simon and Speck algorithms.
The time is in seconds and the length is in bits.
make the system vulnerable to differential attacks easier. This is why we used the
Speck128/128 version.
The first test that we made was to verify that the results matched the test vectors
provided by the authors of the algorithms [8]. Then we tested the implementation of
the algorithm within the code used to communicate the Arduino Uno, the Raspberry
Pi and the domotic system. Here, we could successfully send a command from the
Raspberry pi and accomplish the sending process described in Figure 5.3. Then, with
the Raspberry connected to see what’s happening on the system, as an intruder would
do, we performed any action on the domotic system (turn on/off, change the channel,
play next song, etc) and watched how the response received by the Raspberry was
unintelligible and impossible to relate to an specific order of commands.
The security in this kind of implementation is given by the security of the algo-
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rithm that is used on the microcontroller. This gives us a great flexibility in terms of
choosing a cipher that better suits the application. We could use this same method-
ology not only with the 1-wire protocol, but with other communication protocols
that act in a similar way.
Chapter 6.
Discussion and Future work
In this work we accomplished the main objective of this work by providing security
to the 1-wire channel. Although the chosen ciphers are not entirely secure against
differential attacks, it gives enough security so an intruder that gets to the system
cannot understand or find a way to know how the commands are made. It is im-
portant to note that it’s not just about the applied cipher, there is also a need of
speed and space on this kind of implementations. All of it to give the users a better
experience with the system.
Because we are never completely secure against new attacks to the ciphers or
the systems, as future work we would still need to study further security measures
to avoid any attacks to the system. Here we have focused on the security triad
(Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability), but we could start searching for a way
to guarantee authentication, access control and no-repudiation as well. It would




We have implemented a custom solution for the domotic system studied, that uses 1-
wire as communication protocol. We have fulfilled the objectives of this thesis work
by identifying the restrictions of our system, studying the different cryptographic
algorithms that could suit the system and choose one of them. Finally, we have
made an implementation to the system where it is possible to send all the commands
encrypted for no intruder to understand or use against the owner of the system.
Given that there are new ciphers everyday and new ways to break all of the existing
ones, we need to keep an eye on these changes so we can apply them to our now
secured domotic system.
We have published a scientific article from the preliminary results of this work
(Sections 5.1 and 5.2) that shows if the cryptographic module would affect the final
user’s experience [20].
We can conclude that we have developed a flexible methodology to add security to
a wired domotic system while preserving a good performance and keeping the costs
low for the manufacturer of the system.
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